Posner on Vertical Restraints
C. Scott Hemphill†
INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers the influence of Richard Posner’s judicial opinions about antitrust law. In thirty-six years on the
bench, Posner wrote about one antitrust opinion per year, which
represents roughly 1 percent of his judicial output. The opinions
address a wide range of conduct, from restraints of trade to monopolization to mergers, plus such related issues as antitrust injury, standing, and damages. Posner’s antitrust opinions are
frequently cited by courts and commentators, and many of the
citations are branded with a “Posner, J.” parenthetical.1
I do not attempt a comprehensive account of Posner’s extraordinary influence as a judge. There is too much ground to
cover; indeed, his importance to antitrust law alone has been the
subject of a recent symposium.2 Instead, I focus on a single category of conduct: vertical restraints on distribution, such as resale price maintenance (RPM), maximum RPM, and exclusive
sales territories. Posner, together with other members of the
Chicago School, sought to shift the rule governing these restraints from a flat (per se) prohibition to a more relaxed or nuanced evaluation.
The law of vertical restraints was indeed transformed over
the course of Posner’s long engagement with antitrust law. Three
strategies were important in this effort. First, and most obvious,
Posner deployed economic reasoning to justify more lenient
† Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I thank Harry First,
Eleanor Fox, Bert Huang, Jon Jacobson, Saul Levmore, and Tim Wu for helpful comments. Alex Gelb, Tim Keegan, Alison Perry, and Phantila Phataraprasit provided outstanding research assistance.
1
For an early analysis of citations as a measure of judicial influence, see Richard
A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 69–73 (Chicago 1990). See also Stephen J.
Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 NYU Annual
Survey Am Law 19, 28 (2005) (documenting the frequency of citations of Posner’s opinions between 1998 and 2000).
2
See generally the recent collection in the Antitrust Source, with contributions by
Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Eleanor Fox, Doug Ginsburg, Keith Hylton, and Steve Salop.
Symposium: Judge Posner Retrospective, 18 Antitrust Source 1 (Oct 2018).
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treatment. Once that began to work, and some but not all restraints were subject to lenient treatment, a second strategy
kicked in: to criticize the inconsistencies and press for their
harmonization.
Third, Posner opened up an indirect line of attack by shifting attention from the question of antitrust liability to the question of antitrust injury—whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.
Even if a plaintiff shows an antitrust violation, there might be
no antitrust injury because the plaintiff’s claimed harm is economically incoherent or results from more competition, rather
than less. Antitrust injury provided the means to sidestep and
undermine Supreme Court precedent that Posner disagreed
with but could not ignore.
Posner’s influence as a judge is impossible to isolate from
his impact as a leading antitrust scholar, in part because his
opinions often have drawn on arguments that he first made as
an academic. In vertical restraints, the interaction of judicial
and academic influence is particularly pronounced. Accordingly,
I also discuss Posner’s academic work as it fueled and intersected
with his judicial output.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes Posner’s
successful academic critique of per se liability, which emphasized the benign effects of various vertical restraints and
pressed for consistent treatment among them. Part II explains
how Posner, in one of his first antitrust cases as a judge,
adapted this critique to the evaluation of maximum RPM. Here,
Posner’s conclusion that maximum RPM plaintiffs suffered no
antitrust injury not only offered a new avenue to criticize per se
liability on economic grounds but also set up a new source of inconsistency, this time between the narrow scope of recovery and
broad scope of liability. Part III considers the use of antitrust injury and analogous doctrines as a weapon to undermine other
broad impositions of liability in antitrust law and beyond.
Part IV turns to horizontal restraints, a second area of antitrust law in which one might have expected Posner’s distinctive
scholarship to leave a strong imprint on his work as a judge.
Here, however, Posner did little to convert his academic ideas
about horizontal restraints into law and ultimately became their
fiercest judicial critic. In one of his last antitrust opinions, Posner
shaped Seventh Circuit doctrine to expressly reject one of his
signature academic positions. The contrast to vertical restraints,
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an area in which Posner pressed hard to incorporate his academic views into antitrust law, is stark.
I. THE ACADEMIC CRITIQUE OF PER SE LIABILITY
Vertical intrabrand restraints place restrictions on how a
dealer sells the manufacturer’s product and at what price. For
example, RPM requires a retailer to sell a product at or above a
minimum price set by the manufacturer. Maximum RPM is the
flip side of minimum RPM. It places a ceiling rather than a floor
on the retailer’s price. Nonprice restraints, such as exclusive
sales territories, have broadly similar effects to RPM.
In 1969, when Posner joined the Chicago faculty, all three
types of restraint—RPM, maximum RPM, and nonprice restraints—were unlawful per se.3 The Supreme Court subsequently shifted the law from per se illegality to the more lenient
rule of reason in a series of cases decided over a period of thirty
years.4 The rule of reason requires a plaintiff to demonstrate anticompetitive effects and invites an analysis of procompetitive
justifications and market power. This sea change is widely attributed to a sustained critique of per se liability by Chicago
School thinkers, supported by the judicial opinions of Chicago
School judges.5
Posner’s influence on vertical restraint law arose first as an
academic member of the Chicago School, whose other prominent
members included future judges Robert Bork and Frank Easterbrook. Posner’s initial critique of vertical restraints doctrine was
published in 1975 and incorporated in a book published the following year.6 A major target was the Court’s opinion in United

3
See Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373, 409 (1911)
(RPM); Albrecht v Herald Co, 390 US 145, 152–53 (1968) (maximum RPM); United
States v Arnold, Schwinn & Co, 388 US 365, 382 (1967) (nonprice restraints).
4
See Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 58 (1977) (overruling
Schwinn); State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht); Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 907 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles).
5
See generally Daniel A. Crane, Book Review, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and NeoChicago, 76 U Chi L Rev 1911 (2009) (assessing the influence of the Chicago School on
antitrust doctrine).
6
See generally Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum L Rev 282 (1975). See also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 147–66 (Chicago 1976). Antitrust Law was Posner’s third book, following Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown 1973) and Antitrust: Cases, Economic
Notes, and Other Materials (West 1974).
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States v Arnold, Schwinn, & Co,7 which had imposed per se liability for nonprice restraints.8 Posner was unusually well positioned to criticize Schwinn, having briefed and argued (and won)
the case as a young lawyer in the Solicitor General’s office. The
critique thus represented, as he candidly wrote, a “180-degree
turn.”9
Posner argued that, as an economic matter, nonprice restraints generally lack any anticompetitive effect and often enhance interbrand competition between manufacturers. This approach was, of course, a version of the first strategy discussed
above. For example, an exclusive sales territory may promote
competition by solving a free rider problem among retailers in
the provision of point-of-sale services valued by consumers.10
Meanwhile, a particular restraint might be harmless from the
standpoint of intrabrand competition given the manufacturer’s
strong desire to promote retailer competition and thereby minimize retailer margins.11 Posner advocated lenient treatment for
RPM along the same lines.12
Posner’s scholarship soon caught the attention of the
Supreme Court. In 1977, the Court overruled Schwinn, holding
in Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc13 that nonprice restraints are subject to the rule of reason.14 The Court’s opinion
cited Posner extensively (alongside other academics), noting his
account of the manufacturer’s free rider problem15 and its interest in preserving intrabrand competition.16 Beyond the specific
analysis of nonprice restraints, the Court’s opinion was notable
7

388 US 365 (1967).
Id at 382.
9
Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections
on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U Chi L Rev 1, 2 (1977) (describing the position taken in
Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 282 (cited in note 6)).
10 Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 283–84 (cited in note 6), citing Lester G. Telser, Why
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J L & Econ 86 (1960). Posner argued that
this benefit is particularly important to manufacturers that are trying to enter the market or expand. Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 293 (cited in note 6).
11 Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 283, 287–88 (cited in note 6).
12 As discussed in Part II, the effects of maximum RPM are different.
13 433 US 36 (1977).
14 Id at 58.
15 See id at 55; Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 285 (cited in note 6).
16 See Sylvania, 433 US at 56 n 24 (manufacturer’s interest in minimizing retailer
margins), citing Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 283 (cited in note 6); Sylvania, 433 US at 56
(manufacturer’s interest in intrabrand competition), citing Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at
283, 287–88 (cited in note 6). Posner’s comments about entry and expansion were picked
up by a concurring opinion. See Sylvania, 433 US at 65 & n 7 (White concurring in the
judgment), citing Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 293 (cited in note 6).
8
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for its emphasis on economic analysis.17 This emphasis was amplified by the Court’s repeated citation of Posner and other economically minded scholars and its acknowledgment of heavy academic criticism of the Schwinn rule.18
Posner’s academic work also identified inconsistencies and
pressed for their harmonization, a version of the second strategy.
Nonprice restraints and RPM have similar economic effects.
Among other similarities, both can support interbrand competition. Posner’s pre-Sylvania paper had argued that nonprice restraints and RPM therefore should be treated similarly—that is,
leniently—given their similar economic effects.19 Justice Byron
White, writing separately in Sylvania and anticipating the slippery slope, acknowledged the force of this point as a reason to
resist an economic approach to vertical restraints.20 In a second
paper published a few months after Sylvania, Posner emphasized the inconsistency that Sylvania had opened up between
nonprice restraints (rule of reason) and RPM (per se illegal).21
He pointed to the Sylvania Court’s emphasis on free riding and
interbrand competition as a reason to get rid of per se liability
for RPM and maximum RPM, describing the latter as an “endangered” precedent.22
Posner spotted a further discrepancy arising from Sylvania,
between nonprice restraints and maximum RPM. Maximum
RPM is useful as a way to rein in exploitation of market power
by a dealer, including market power arising from the grant of
exclusive sales territories. On the one hand, Sylvania permitted
some exclusive sales territories under the rule of reason. Yet the
Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht v Herald Co23 flatly prohibited the use of maximum RPM, despite its usefulness in conjunction with those sales territories. Posner exploited the resulting
tension, pointing to the facts of Albrecht itself:
17 See Sylvania, 433 US at 53 n 21 (“Competitive economies have social and political as well as economic advantages, . . . but an antitrust policy divorced from market
considerations would lack any objective benchmarks.”).
18 See id at 47–48 & n 13, citing generally Posner, 75 Colum L Rev 282 (cited in
note 6), among others.
19 Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 298 (cited in note 6) (advocating consistently lenient
treatment for both types of restraint). Posner further argued that restraints achieved
through agency rather than sales contracts should be treated the same. Id.
20 Sylvania, 433 US at 70 (White concurring in the judgment), citing Posner, 75
Colum L Rev at 298 (cited in note 6).
21 Posner, 45 U Chi L Rev at 7–9 (cited in note 9).
22 Id at 10.
23 390 US 145 (1968).
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Because the publisher [in Albrecht] had assigned the distributors exclusive territories, the most likely reason for the
price ceiling was to prevent the distributor from using his
distribution monopoly for his benefit rather than the publisher’s. The logic of Sylvania is that restrictions imposed on
dealers by manufacturers promote interbrand competition
and are therefore not per se illegal, save perhaps if the
manufacturer has a monopoly. That logic demolishes
Albrecht.24
The implication was that Albrecht was wrongly decided, at least
when maximum RPM was used for this purpose.
II. ANTITRUST INJURY AND MAXIMUM RPM
In 1981, when Posner joined the Seventh Circuit, the evolution in vertical restraints doctrine was well underway. As a
judge, Posner soon had an opportunity to put his academic critiques to practical use.25 In 1984, his court took up Jack Walters
& Sons Corp v Morton Building, Inc,26 a maximum RPM claim
squarely within the Albrecht rule.27
Posner’s opinion rejecting the antitrust claim criticized both
the economic reasoning underlying Albrecht and its fit with other
cases. The opinion explained, relying on Easterbrook’s academic
work, that maximum RPM tends to force prices down toward the
competitive level.28 Moreover, as discussed above, maximum
RPM can have a particular procompetitive effect in conjunction
with exclusive dealer territories by reining in the exploitation of
market power. Posner also reviewed the discrepancy between
Sylvania and Albrecht identified in his own academic writing,29

24

Posner, 45 U Chi L Rev at 12 (cited in note 9).
By this point, Posner had written a third paper proposing per se legality for all
intrabrand restraints. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U Chi L Rev 6, 23 (1981).
26 737 F2d 698 (7th Cir 1984).
27 Id at 706.
28 Id at 706–07, citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U Chi L
Rev 886, 890 n 20 (1981).
29 Id at 706 (“Now that assigning exclusive territories to dealers is lawful if reasonable, a manufacturer-imposed price ceiling intended to limit the power that exclusive
territories give dealers to raise prices regardless of what other dealers in the manufacturer’s product are charging may also be lawful in some cases.”).
25
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although (characteristically) he did not cite that work in the
opinion.30
These two arguments obviously did not provide an adequate
basis for ignoring controlling Supreme Court precedent. Posner
then turned to a third strategy that sidestepped Albrecht rather
than directly confronting it. The vehicle for this shift was the
antitrust injury doctrine.
Antitrust injury requires a private plaintiff seeking damages
to show not only that its injury was caused by unlawful conduct
but also that its injury was caused by that which makes the
conduct unlawful. This hurdle to recovery was announced in
Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,31 a case decided a
few months before Sylvania that initially received much less attention. The plaintiff alleged compensable harm caused by a
merger of competing bowling centers. Its theory of harm was
that absent the merger, some of the bowling centers would have
gone out of business, thereby benefiting the plaintiff. In essence,
plaintiff complained about an increase in competition rather
than a decrease.32
The Court reviewed the statutory provision providing a
right of recovery to “person[s] . . . injured . . . by reason of” an
antitrust violation.33 The Court decided that although the plaintiff might literally be a “person injured by reason of” unlawful
conduct, damages were unavailable because the plaintiff’s loss
did not occur “‘by reason of’ that which made the acquisitions
unlawful.”34 Even if plaintiff suffered injury, it did not suffer
“antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”35
Antitrust injury is sometimes framed as being about the
“wrong plaintiff”: yes, the conduct complained of may well be anticompetitive, but this plaintiff does not have an injury that
flows from the anticompetitive nature of the conduct. However,

30 Instead, the opinion cited Robert Pitofsky for this point. See Robert Pitofsky, The
Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 Colum L Rev 1,
16 n 59 (1978).
31 429 US 477 (1977).
32 See id at 480–81.
33 15 USC § 15 (codifying § 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides a cause of action to
“any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws”).
34 Brunswick, 429 US at 488 (emphasis added).
35 Id at 489 (emphasis in original).
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it can equally be understood as denying recovery for the wrong
kind of harm.
In Jack Walters, Posner explained that “[t]here is nothing
esoteric about the Brunswick rule. It is the application to antitrust law of venerable principles of tort causation illustrated by
Gorris v Scott.”36 Gorris is a nineteenth-century English tort
case that Posner had examined in academic work with Bill
Landes the year before.37 Posner described the case as follows:
The plaintiff’s animals, which were being transported on the
deck of the defendant’s ship, were washed overboard in a
storm. They would have been saved if the deck had been
penned, as required by statute. But since the purpose of the
statute was to prevent contagion, not drowning, the defendant was not liable.38
The Gorris analogy brings together two common features of
Posner opinions: an effort to demystify specialized law by connecting it back to general principles and a love of vivid facts. He
found reason to cite Gorris in ten subsequent opinions, about
half as often as Raffles v Wichelhaus.39
Applying the Brunswick/Gorris rule to the claim at hand,
Posner concluded that the plaintiff’s only harm came from competitors’ lower prices, which was hardly the sort of harm that
antitrust is concerned about.40 And in a further twist of the
knife, Posner found plaintiff’s case even weaker than in Gorris.
There, “[t]he loss of the animals was a pure social cost, while the
loss to [plaintiff] from lawful price competition was a gain to
consumers.”41
So far as I know, this was Posner’s first discussion of antitrust injury. I am not aware of his having previously discussed
the issue in his own academic work. Posner may have been encouraged to adopt an antitrust injury approach in Jack Walters

36

Jack Walters, 737 F2d at 708–09 (citation omitted).
See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J Legal Stud 109, 130–31 (1983).
38 Jack Walters, 737 F2d at 709.
39 159 Eng Rep 375 (Ex 1864). See William Domnarski, Richard Posner 111 (Oxford
2016) (reporting that Gorris is Posner’s second most frequently cited nineteenth-century
English opinion after Raffles).
40 Jack Walters, 737 F2d at 709 (“[T]he only harm to Walters came from the fact
that competing dealers (or Morton itself) would lower their prices to consumers if Walters
did not.”).
41 Id.
37
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by an academic article, authored by Bill Page and cited in the
opinion, that itself bears a strong Chicago imprint.42
Jack Walters illustrates the real potential of antitrust injury.
A defendant or court can sidestep and neutralize the effect of liability while leaving the formal scope of liability undisturbed.
This tool is particularly powerful when the legal case for liability
is ironclad, yet the economic theory of harm is incoherent given
the goals of the statute. From this perspective, Albrecht was a
perfect target. A further consequence is to place pressure on liability over time, as judges give voice to the analytical problems
with overbroad liability.
Posner’s opinion gave a “jolt” to the antitrust bar.43 Commentators recognized it as an indirect attack on Albrecht.44 The
Ninth Circuit, in a maximum RPM case called USA Petroleum
Co v Atlantic Richfield Co (ARCO),45 staked out a flatly contrary
view to Jack Walters, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.46
At oral argument, respondent characterized the Ninth Circuit’s
disagreement with Judge Posner as follows:

42 See id, citing William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An
Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U Chi L Rev 467, 491 (1980). Page was a Chicago LLM
student, and Posner commented on the paper in draft. The subject was apparently first
proposed to Page by another Chicago colleague, Kenneth Dam, who suggested that
“[m]aybe the principle [of Brunswick] can be extended. You may not be able to do much
about the substantive law, but you might be able to affect the penalties.” John E. Lopatka
and William H. Page, Brunswick at 25: Antitrust Injury and the Evolution of Antitrust
Law, 17 Antitrust 20, 20 (Fall 2002).
43 Donald J. Polden, Antitrust Standing and the Rule against Resale Price Maintenance, 37 Cleve St L Rev 179, 217 (1989) (“The antitrust bar received a jolt. . . .”).
44 For example, Herbert Hovenkamp wrote:

[A]ny rule requiring a plaintiff to show that it has been injured by the anticompetitive consequences of maximum resale price maintenance is a rule of
nonrecovery. I cannot escape the conclusion that Judge Posner—growing impatient with Congress’s or the Supreme Court’s refusal to overrule Albrecht—has
decided to undertake that task on his own.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 Duke L J 1014, 1026. See also
Mark E. Roszkowski, Vertical Maximum Price Fixing: In Defense of Albrecht, 23 Loyola
U Chi L J 209, 212 (1992) (criticizing Jack Walters as an illustration of the claim that
the Seventh Circuit, “unable directly to overrule Albrecht,” had narrowed it by means of
the antitrust injury doctrine); Polden, 37 Cleve St L Rev at 219–20 (cited in noted 43)
(criticizing the Seventh Circuit view, illustrated by Jack Walters, as unduly elevating
allocative efficiency and resulting in a rule of nonrecovery for certain antitrust violations); John J. Flynn, The “Is” and “Ought” of Vertical Restraints after Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 Cornell L Rev 1095, 1118–19 (1986) (broadly criticizing
maximum RPM analysis in Jack Walters).
45 859 F2d 687 (9th Cir 1988), revd, 495 US 328 (1990).
46 Id at 697 & n 15; 490 US 1097 (1989) (granting certiorari).
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I can’t substitute myself for Judges Reinhardt and Nelson,
but I’ll tell you what I think is [in] their head. I think that
the Seventh Circuit in Jack Walter[s] and [another case]
said that there can be good price fixing. I [was] shocked by
Judge Posner’s statement . . . that price fixing can be procompetitive; [that] it’s a legitimate competitive weapon.47
The Court’s ARCO opinion, written by Justice William Brennan,
vindicated Judge Posner’s position.48 The court concluded that
even for a per se violation such as maximum RPM (Albrecht had
not yet been overruled), antitrust injury must be shown, given
its distinct purpose: “It ensures that the harm claimed by the
plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of
the antitrust laws in the first place, and it prevents losses that
stem from competition from supporting suits by private plaintiffs for either damages or equitable relief.”49
Jack Walters and ARCO had several effects. First, by undercutting the availability of damages, they reduced the attractiveness of maximum RPM cases to private plaintiffs. Government
enforcers do not need to show antitrust injury,50 and hence their
incentive to bring maximum RPM cases was unaffected. However,
enforcers’ interest in bringing these cases was quite low. Thus,
in practice these cases came close to a stealth overruling of
Albrecht.
Second, Jack Walters and ARCO paved the way for the formal
overruling of Albrecht.51 In Khan v State Oil Co,52 the Seventh
Circuit reviewed a form of maximum RPM imposed by a gasoline supplier on its customer, a gas station.53 Under the contract,
the station paid the supplier a wholesale price that was 3.25
cents less than the station’s “suggested” retail price. Any proceeds above the suggested price were rebated to the supplier.54
47 Transcript of Oral Argument, Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum Co, No 881668, *45–46 (US filed Dec 5, 1989), archived at http://perma.cc/V65G-8Q79.
48 Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum Co, 495 US 328, 345–46 (1990).
49 Id at 342.
50 See California v American Stores Co, 495 US 271, 295–96 (1990) (describing the
greater burden of private litigants compared to government enforcers).
51 For a critical view of the role of antitrust injury, see Jonathan M. Jacobson and
Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the Alley with Brunswick v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 Antitrust L J 273, 303 (1998) (“By basing its decision on antitrust
injury grounds, the ARCO Court unnecessarily delayed the demise of Albrecht seven more
years, giving the precedent additional time to do more damage in the lower courts.”).
52 93 F3d 1358 (7th Cir 1996).
53 Id at 1359–60.
54 Id at 1360.
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As in Jack Walters, Posner once again discussed how maximum RPM can serve as a brake on the exercise of dealer market
power55 and noted the incongruity between Sylvania’s permissiveness toward dealer territories and the unbending Albrecht
rule.56 Moreover, in the wake of ARCO, Posner had a new tension to point out—that between ARCO and Albrecht.57 However,
as with Jack Walters, these arguments alone were not enough to
justify ignoring Albrecht as controlling precedent. Posner continued to resist the strategy, adopted (for example) by Judge
Bork, of declaring a per se precedent effectively overruled in advance of the Supreme Court taking that step.58
In contrast to Jack Walters, Posner concluded that the third
strategy—to deny the existence of plaintiff’s antitrust injury—
was not available because, on his reading of the reasoning in
ARCO, the Court apparently regarded maximum RPM as (sometimes) producing antitrust injury after all.59 Ultimately, Posner
declared Albrecht to be “unsound when decided,” lamented its
“increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations,”60 and held that
Albrecht controlled the facts of the case, effectively inviting the
Supreme Court to reverse him. In State Oil Co v Khan,61 the
Court unanimously obliged, overruling Albrecht while adopting

55 Id at 1362 (“As for maximum resale price fixing, unless the supplier is a monopsonist he cannot squeeze his dealers’ margins below a competitive level. . . . A supplier
might, however, fix a maximum resale price in order to prevent his dealers from exploiting a monopoly position.”).
56 State Oil, 93 F3d at 1363.
57 Id (“We have considerable sympathy with the argument that Albrecht is inconsistent with the cases that establish the requirement of proving antitrust injury. In fact,
we think the argument is right and that it may well portend the doom of Albrecht.”).
58 See Rothery Storage & Van Co v Atlas Van Lines, Inc, 792 F2d 210, 229 (DC Cir
1986) (concluding that two Supreme Court per se precedents, United States v Sealy Corp,
388 US 350 (1967), and United States v Topco Associates, 405 US 596 (1972), are “effectively overruled” by other rule-of-reason precedents).
59 In ARCO, the plaintiff was a competitor of the dealers subject to maximum RPM.
Posner explained that the ARCO Court had distinguished Albrecht on the ground that
those dealers, rather than a competitor, were the “intended beneficiaries of Albrecht.”
State Oil, 93 F3d at 1364, discussing ARCO, 495 US at 336–37. From this distinction,
Posner drew the implication that the Court regarded such dealers as having antitrust
injury after all, apparently contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion on this point in
Jack Walters.
60 State Oil, 93 F3d at 1363. For example, unlike other vertical restraints, maximum RPM does not interfere with price cutting, and (as discussed in the text) helps to
reduce the potential anticompetitive effect of other vertical restraints by controlling the
harmful effects of dealer territories.
61 522 US 3 (1997).
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much of the reasoning set out in Posner’s two maximum RPM
opinions.62
III. ANTITRUST INJURY BEYOND MAXIMUM RPM
The potential use of antitrust injury as a means to undermine the rigid imposition of liability is not limited to maximum
RPM. Consider minimum RPM, which after State Oil Co v Khan
was the last remaining vertical intrabrand restraint still subject
to per se liability. Several Seventh Circuit opinions chipped
away at RPM on antitrust injury grounds.63 For example, in
Isaksen v Vermont Castings, Inc,64 Posner considered a lostprofits claim from a dealer forced to “knuckl[e] under” to a manufacturer’s imposition of RPM.65 Such a dealer could be expected
to claim that it had been forced to charge an unprofitably high
price.
Here, the antitrust injury objection was not that the challenged restraint was actually procompetitive. The issue was
subtle: that prior to being forced into compliance, the dealer’s
profits might have resulted, in part, from undercutting competing RPM-compliant dealers.66 Posner wrote: “The prevention of
free riding is not, as yet anyway, a defense to a charge of resale
price maintenance; but neither is being prevented from taking a
free ride on another dealer’s efforts a form of antitrust injury
compensable by a damage award.”67 Put another way, dealer
profits inflated by the other dealers’ compliance with the RPM
scheme offered an improper benchmark for calculating damages.68

62

See id at 20–22.
See Isaksen v Vermont Castings, Inc, 825 F2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir 1987); Local
Beauty Supply, Inc v Lamaur Inc, 787 F2d 1197, 1201–03 (7th Cir 1986).
64 825 F2d 1158 (7th Cir 1987).
65 Id at 1162.
66 The same issue had arisen in another case. In Local Beauty Supply, a dealer
complained that due to termination, it had been denied the opportunity to undercut and
free-ride on the investments of RPM-compliant dealers. In other words, “plaintiffs’ . . .
profits were attributable to the violation of which they complained.” Local Beauty Supply, 787 F2d at 1203. The increased competition from ending RPM would hurt rather
than help the plaintiff.
67 Isaksen, 825 F2d at 1165, citing Local Beauty Supply, 787 F2d at 1202.
68 Moreover, because the jury had no basis for distinguishing which part of the
damages claim was based on an improper benchmark, the court concluded that the damages part of the case must be retried. Isaksen, 825 F2d at 1165.
63
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Other defendants used antitrust injury to launch a frontal
attack on RPM.69 For example, in PSKS, Inc v Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc,70 defendants sought to introduce the testimony of an economic expert to show “that consumers have not
been harmed by Leegin’s conduct [and] that the arrangement
promotes interbrand competition.”71 The district court, unwilling
to grant defendants an indirect route to nullifying the per se
rule, rejected this approach.72 Ultimately, the case reached the
Supreme Court as Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v
PSKS, Inc,73 in which the Supreme Court duly overruled its
precedent, switching the test from per se liability to the rule of
reason.74
Beyond its continuing application in “wrong plaintiff” cases
such as competitors complaining about a merger or horizontal
agreement,75 the antitrust injury strategy has potential application in any context in which arguably procompetitive conduct is
subject to per se liability. With the continuing decline of per se
liability in antitrust law, that domain is shrinking. A remaining
example is tying cases, in which a modified per se approach applies.76 Defendants in these cases sometimes argue that even if
liability attaches to the conduct, their conditional sale results in

69 Some commentators perceived such a goal in Isaksen itself. See Roger D. Blair
and Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 Vand L Rev 1539, 1557 (1989)
(“Although the Seventh Circuit opinions [in Isaksen and Local Beauty Supply] are expressed in terms of antitrust injury, they also can be seen as having the substantive impact of making resale price maintenance effectively per se lawful.”).
70 2004 WL 5374523 (ED Tex).
71 Id at *1.
72 Id. See also PSKS, Inc v Leegin Creative Leather Prods, 2004 WL 5254322, *1–2
(ED Tex) (denying defendant’s motion for a new trial and repeating the court’s understanding that the defendant offered an indirect strategy for attacking the per se classification for RPM). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. PSKS, Inc v Leegin Creative Leather Prods,
171 Fed Appx 464, 467–68 (5th Cir 2006) (concluding that plaintiff established antitrust
injury).
73 551 US 877 (2007).
74 Id at 882.
75 For example, in Hammes v AAMCO Transmissions, Inc, 33 F3d 774 (7th Cir
1994), a dealer complained of exclusion from an advertising pool of other dealers. Defendants argued that the plaintiff had failed to allege antitrust injury. Posner agreed
that a mere deprivation of cartel profits would not be compensable harm but had a different take on the complaint. Perhaps the plaintiff had wanted to undersell the dealers,
he reasoned, and exclusion from the advertising pool was punishment. Posner concluded
that this type of injury would indeed be compensable, and at the dismissal stage, it could
not yet be said whether this was plaintiff’s theory. Id at 782–83.
76 This approach was set out in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466
US 2 (1984).
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no economically coherent harm or that the particular plaintiff
has not alleged a compensable harm.77
Antitrust injury also furnished Posner with an analogy for
use outside of antitrust law. For example, he deployed the antitrust injury approach while sitting as a district judge in a patent
infringement case. In SmithKline Beecham Corp v Apotex Corp,78
Posner considered a claim of patent infringement brought by a
branded drug maker against a would-be generic competitor.79 To
simplify a complex set of facts, the patent at issue covered a particular crystalline structure of the drug’s active ingredient. The
generic made a different version of the active ingredient with a
crystalline structure that was in the public domain. The brand
presented evidence that the patented version would nevertheless be present in the generic’s product in minute quantities, albeit as an unwanted byproduct that added nothing to the safety
or efficacy of the drug.
Posner held a two-week bench trial and issued a lengthy
opinion about two weeks later.80 As one of several grounds for
denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs, Posner concluded that the
plaintiff’s injury was not of the kind that the law was intended
to prevent.81 To buttress this conclusion, he pointed to antitrust
injury, citing Jack Walters82 and “the colorful though very sad

77 See, for example, Midwest Gas Services, Inc v Indiana Gas Co, 317 F3d 703, 712–
13 (7th Cir 2003) (affirming dismissal of tying claims because claimed injury of lost profits resulted from conduct that was not anticompetitive); Todorov v DCH Healthcare Authority, 921 F2d 1438, 1453–54 (11th Cir 1991) (holding that, similar to Local Beauty
Supply, no antitrust injury was present when the harm complained of was a lost opportunity to profit from the anticompetitive scheme); CBC Companies, Inc v Equifax, Inc,
561 F3d 569, 571–73 (6th Cir 2009) (dismissing a tying claim for lack of antitrust injury
on the ground that allegations of harm in the tied product market were merely conclusory). But see Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc v Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, 604 F3d
1291, 1303 (11th Cir 2010) (concluding, in a tying case, that the plaintiff alleged antitrust injury resulting from its exclusion in tied product market).
78 247 F Supp 2d 1011 (ND Ill 2003). I clerked for Judge Posner when this case was
decided.
79 Id at 1013.
80 Id at 1011, 1013 (reporting that a bench trial was held from February 5 to February
21 and an opinion issued on March 3, 2003).
81 Id at 1048. See also Kaz Manufacturing Co v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc, 317 F2d
679, 680 n 3 (2d Cir 1963) (“[O]ne who constructs a patented wall safe but uses it only as
an anchor for his boat would not be a patent infringer since such use would not be for the
purpose of utilizing the teachings of the patent.”).
82 SmithKline Beecham, 247 F Supp 2d at 1048, citing Jack Walters, 737 F2d at
708–09.
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old case” of Gorris v Scott.83 Posner’s approach has been echoed
in recent academic calls to recognize “IP injury” and enforce IP
law only when there is a violation of a core IP policy.84 The Federal
Circuit never reached this argument in SmithKline Beecham, affirming on other grounds,85 and the real-world influence of this
idea remains to be seen.
IV. HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS
In altering the law of vertical restraints, Posner’s scholarship and judicial opinions have had a powerful and synergistic
effect. Horizontal restraints provide a stark contrast. Here too,
Posner staked out a distinctive position as an academic, but his
opinions do not reflect similar progress toward judicial implementation. Instead, Posner ultimately became their leading judicial opponent.
During his first year as an academic, prior to joining the
Chicago faculty, Posner considered what forms of collusion constitute an agreement—a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade”86—as required under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. Collusion, as I use the term here, refers to coordination by
rivals as to some aspect of competition (for example, price or
customers served) such that the firms achieve higher profits
compared to a benchmark in which the parties did not coordinate in this manner. The benchmark is the equilibrium outcome
if the parties met just once in the marketplace. The gains from
collusion come from cooperation over time in refraining from
competition, despite each firm’s temptation to cheat on the
arrangement.
Collusion can be either express or tacit. Tacit collusion refers
to interdependent conduct87 unaccompanied by communications
between or among the parties. By contrast, express collusion is

83 SmithKline Beecham, 247 F Supp 2d at 1048 (“The principle is general and I
cannot think of any reason why it should not apply to patent law.”).
84 See, for example, Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation 50–55 (Oxford 2012).
85 SmithKline Beecham Corp v Apotex Corp, 403 F3d 1331, 1334 (Fed Cir 2005).
86 15 USC § 1.
87 See Louis Kaplow, Direct versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price
Fixing, 3 J Legal Analysis 449, 451 (2011) (defining interdependence as a situation in
which “firms refrain from price cutting because of an expectation of retaliation derived from
a shared appreciation of their circumstances”). See also Donald F. Turner, The Definition
of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
Harv L Rev 655, 663 (1962) (discussing “conscious parallelism”).
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collusion that is not tacit—that is, reaching a collusive outcome
with the assistance of communications. Communications facilitate collusion by helping to solve the economic challenges of coordination and prevention of cheating.
There is consensus that collusion supported by communication suffices to establish an agreement. To this end, a plaintiff
might present direct evidence of agreement, such as a videotape
of the conspirators caught in the act. In other cases, a plaintiff
presents circumstantial evidence that indicates that the parties
must have communicated, such as an unusual pattern of behavior that is hard to explain without communication.88 The question that interested Posner is whether purely tacit collusion is
enough to satisfy the agreement requirement, either because
such collusion is unlawful in its own right or because evidence of
tacit collusion is probative of the existence of unobserved communications. The Supreme Court has not offered a clear answer
to this question.89
Posner’s 1969 paper on the subject staked out the position
that tacit collusion does violate antitrust law.90 He emphasized
that the structure of the problem of oligopolistic price elevation
does not depend on “detectable acts of collusion.”91 Price elevation is a voluntary rather than inevitable act. Posner acknowledged that identifying actionable price elevation would be difficult and, with respect to remedies, thought that the main
challenge was to make sure that damages are high enough to
achieve adequate deterrence given the difficulties of proving a
case and the reluctance of courts to impose high penalties.92
As a judge, however, Posner made little effort to nudge the
law toward an explicit recognition of liability for tacit collusion.
His comments on the subject were notably circumspect. For example, in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation,93
Posner wrote that “it is generally believed, and the plaintiffs
88

See, for example, Interstate Circuit, Inc v United States, 306 US 208, 221 (1939).
For perspectives on the case law, see Louis Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price
Fixing 69–92 (Princeton 2013); Keith N. Hylton, Oligopoly Pricing and Richard Posner,
18 Antitrust Source 1, 10–13 (Oct 2018).
90 See generally Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 Stan L Rev 1562 (1969). This work was also incorporated in Posner’s antitrust book. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective at 47 (cited in note 6).
91 Posner, 21 Stan L Rev at 1562 (cited in note 90). See also id at 1575 (“There is
. . . no vital difference between formal cartels and tacit collusive arrangements; the latter
are simply easier to conceal.”).
92 Id at 1590–91.
93 295 F3d 651 (7th Cir 2002).
89
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implicitly accept, that an express, manifested agreement, and
thus an agreement involving actual, verbalized communication,
must be proved in order for a price-fixing conspiracy to be actionable under the Sherman Act.”94 This statement left open the
possibility of a broader definition without endorsing it. In JTC
Petroleum v Piasa Motor Fuels,95 Posner went a bit further, musing that when “oligopolistic interdependence” could be shown, a
plaintiff could establish the existence of “a combination or a (tacit)
conspiracy.”96
Around 2015, Posner took a sharp turn against his previous
academic views. The first evidence was a review of Louis
Kaplow’s book about horizontal agreement and price fixing.97
Kaplow’s book offers a sophisticated attack on a conception of
agreement that is limited to express collusion.98 In the review,
Posner repudiated his previous view that tacit collusion or mere
interdependence is actionable.99 He despaired that efforts to remediate interdependent pricing would face insuperable practical
difficulties (an issue that Posner had acknowledged even in the
1960s). In particular, an injunction would be futile: How could a
court implement or a firm respond to the requirement that a
firm instead charge a more competitive price, or cease taking its
competitor’s prices into account?100
This change of heart found its way into Seventh Circuit jurisprudence in Posner’s 2015 opinion in In re Text Messaging
Antitrust Litigation.101 Plaintiffs had alleged a conspiracy by four
wireless carriers to fix the price of text messages.102 At the dismissal stage, the court (in an opinion also written by Posner)
94

Id at 654.
190 F3d 775 (7th Cir 1999).
96 Id at 780. At the same time, Judge Posner declined to recognize a shared monopoly theory under § 2, by which he meant collective liability without any showing of
agreement among the excluders. Id.
97 See generally Richard A. Posner, Book Review, Review of Kaplow, Competition
Policy and Price Fixing, 79 Antitrust L J 761 (2014).
98 See Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing at 387–97 (cited in note 89).
99 Posner, 79 Antitrust L J at 763 (cited in note 97).
100 Id at 764, 767. Here, Posner’s view echoed those made by his opponent, Don
Turner, in the 1960s. See Turner, 75 Harv L Rev at 669 (cited in note 87) (“[S]uch an injunction, read literally, appears to demand such irrational behavior that full compliance
would be virtually impossible.”).
101 782 F3d 867 (7th Cir 2015).
102 The claims involved “per use” message pricing, as opposed to a monthly charge
for a certain number (often unlimited) of messages. Plaintiffs alleged that the four defendants, in a series of ten steps from 2005 to 2008, raised the price of per-use texts from
as low as two cents to twenty cents. Id at 875.
95
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had allowed the case to proceed.103 The 2015 opinion reviewed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants after discovery.
Here, Posner bluntly stated that “[e]xpress collusion violates antitrust law; tacit collusion does not.”104 Posner concluded
that evidence of a market structure conducive to collusion and of
noncompetitive market performance were insufficient because
they did not clearly point toward express collusion.105 According
to Keith Hylton, Posner’s opinion is the first at the appellate
level to “so clearly” state that tacit collusion is insufficient to
support a § 1 violation.106
Text Messaging has influenced other courts107 and has begun
to attract commentary.108 To the extent that Posner’s new view
ultimately takes hold, it may be difficult to separate the influence of Posner the judge (in embracing this view) from Posner
the commentator (in withdrawing as a prominent supporter of
the contrary position).
CONCLUSION
The Jack Walters and Text Messaging opinions bookend an
exceptional judicial career. In Jack Walters, one of Posner’s first
antitrust opinions, we see the judge pressing hard to incorporate
his academic views into antitrust law. In Text Messaging, one of
Posner’s last, we see the reverse: shaping Seventh Circuit law to
expressly reject one of his signature academic positions. At the
same time, Posner’s disparate approach to these two areas of antitrust doctrine share an important point of commonality, one entirely in keeping with his iconoclastic approach to other areas of

103 In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F3d 622, 628–29 (7th Cir 2010)
(discussing Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007)).
104 Text Messaging, 782 F3d at 872.
105 Id at 879.
106 Hylton, 18 Antitrust Source at 3 (cited in note 89) (“As far as I am aware, [Text
Messaging] is the first appellate court opinion to state such a position so clearly.”).
107 See, for example, Valspar Corp v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 873 F3d 185,
200 & n 13 (3d Cir 2017) (citing Text Messaging for the proposition that acting in accordance with tacit understanding of how competitors will act is not actionable). See also
Kleen Products LLC v Georgia-Pacific LLC, 910 F3d 927, 935 (7th Cir 2018) (similar).
108 See, for example, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Posner on Antitrust Remedies: The Good,
the Bad, and the Very Ugly, 18 Antitrust Source 1, 7–9 & n 47 (Oct 2018) (discussing
Posner’s changed view); Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the
Time of Algorithms, 100 Minn L Rev 1323, 1343 (2016) (“[T]he advent of the robo-seller
shifts the balance between these arguments in the direction of Posner’s half-century-old
argument.”).
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law. Whether the target is a Supreme Court case he had won
just a few years previously or a long-held academic view, Posner
has never been afraid to change his mind.

